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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 




On December 17, 1997, a district court jury convicted 
Allen W. Stewart, formerly a partner in a Philadelphia law 
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firm, of 135 counts of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. S 1341, wire 
fraud, 18 U.S.C. S 1343, money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 
S 1957, and racketeering, 18 U.S.C. S 1962(c). On August 
12, 1998, the court sentenced Stewart to 180 months in 
prison, to be followed by three years of supervised release 
and required him to forfeit substantially all of his known 
assets and to pay $60 million in restitution. 
 
Stewart appeals from the judgment of conviction and 
sentence, raising many legal issues as to why he is entitled 
to a new trial or an acquittal. Stewart also challenges the 
district court's forfeiture of his personal Merrill Lynch 
account ("the Account") as substitute assets under 18 
U.S.C. S 982(b)(1). The government cross-appeals the 
district court's ruling that the Account was not directly 
forfeitable under 18 U.S.C. S 982(a)(1) as property "involved 
in" or "traceable to" Stewart's money laundering activities. 
For the reasons that follow, we will affirm Stewart's 
conviction and sentence and the other orders from which 
he appeals. We, however, will reverse on the government's 
cross-appeal and thus will modify the district court's 
forfeiture order so that the Account is forfeited directly 
rather than as a substitute asset. As modified, we will 




A. Factual History 
 
This case involves a very complicated series of fraudulent 
transactions that we only summarize. Stewart's activities 
revolved around various insurance companies and shell 
corporations he created to facilitate his fraudulent 
transactions. Stewart's two main vehicles for his criminal 
activities were Summit National Life Insurance Company 
("Summit"), formerly an Ohio corporation that moved to 
Pennsylvania, and Equitable Benefit Life Insurance 
Company ("EBL"), a Pennsylvania corporation. In 1994, the 
Pennsylvania Department of Insurance ("Department") took 
control of these companies because they were insolvent. 
Stewart had sold these companies for a nominal amount 
immediately before their insolvency was revealed. During 
his ownership, each company reported that its assets 
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exceeded its liabilities. These surpluses were fraudulent, 
however, as the companies inflated their assets with 
unsecured worthless IOUs and accounting acrobatics aimed 
at concealing the huge deficits that Stewart created by his 
leveraged purchase of Summit and by his other conduct. 
 
The fraudulent transactions began in 1988 when 
Stewart, who already owned EBL through a holding 
company, bought Summit. Stewart originally became 
involved in the Summit purchase as Richard Fanslow's 
attorney in Fanslow's attempt to acquire Summit. To 
facilitate the acquisition of Summit, Fanslow created a shell 
corporation to buy Summit for $52 million, subject to post- 
closing adjustments. When Fanslow's bid failed because of 
the disapproval of Ohio's insurance regulators, Stewart 
stepped in as the purchaser. When Stewart took over, he 
needed approximately $62 million to buy out Fanslow and 
purchase Summit. 
 
In preparing to purchase Summit, Stewart formed a 
Pennsylvania partnership called Summit Company in which 
he assigned the interests as follows: 9% to himself, 9% to 
his wife, 34% to a stepson, 24% to a trust he had created 
for another stepson, and 24% to a trust he had created for 
his son. Despite his 9% ownership, Stewart exercised 
actual control over the partnership. According to the 
purchase agreement between Stewart and Fanslow, Stewart 
was to pay Fanslow $473,499 in cash, deliver a $6.4 million 
promissory note to him and pay a large portion of Fanslow's 
deposit to acquire Summit. On October 6, 1988, Stewart 
acquired Summit with a $47.7 million bank loan and a 
$2.7 million contribution from EBL. 
 
Stewart then needed approximately $62 million to pay 
the bank, Fanslow, and other expenses, as well as to secure 
the promissory note. Summit's $31 million capital and 
surplus could not cover this amount, so Stewart devised a 
number of schemes to pay off his debts without showing a 
reduction in Summit's assets. 
 
First, Summit sent more than $70 million to EBL. In 
turn, EBL passed $62 million through a handful of 
Stewart's shell corporations, which eventually paid the 
bank loan and Fanslow. In return for the $62 million, these 
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shell corporations generated a series of unsecured IOUs to 
EBL and Summit. 
 
Stewart made these transfers pursuant to a reinsurance 
agreement between EBL and Summit. In exchange for the 
$70 million it received from Summit, EBL agreed to pay 
future claims on a portion of Summit's policies. Summit, in 
turn, recorded a reduction in liabilities corresponding to its 
reduction in assets when it gave EBL the $70 million. EBL 
recorded a corresponding increase in assets and liabilities. 
However, Summit continued to make the payments on 
claims for which EBL supposedly assumed responsibility. 
Stewart continued hiding Summit's missing assets by 
double-pledging the collateral used to secure the Fanslow 
promissory note and through further fraudulent 
transactions whereby Stewart would circulate money taken 
from Summit through his other corporations before 
returning it to Summit as payments on the IOUs. Summit 
also engaged in a sham reinsurance agreement with an 
unrelated insurance company, similar to the fraudulent 
agreement it had entered into with EBL, and purchased 
another insurance company in 1992, to which it assigned 
all of EBL's profitable business. 
 
Stewart did not inform the Ohio insurance regulators of 
his acquisition of Summit. When they learned of it, the 
regulators disapproved and ordered the transaction 
unwound. Stewart then sued the Ohio Commissioner of 
Insurance following which the parties reached a settlement 
in which Summit agreed to sell its Ohio policies to another 
insurer and move out of Ohio. 
 
In addition to his fraudulent efforts to conceal the deficits 
in his insurance companies, Stewart also began stealing 
funds from Summit for his personal use. Pursuant to its 
agreement with the Ohio regulators, Summit sold 25% of its 
policies to an unrelated insurance company, Continental 
Western, and its parent, Beneficial Life Insurance Company 
("Beneficial"), in exchange for an annual return of 90% of 
the profits from these policies. In January 1992, Stewart 
caused Summit to assign, without compensation, this 
agreement to another shell corporation he controlled. He 
used the payments from Beneficial to help purchase a $1.6 
million ocean-front house in Del Mar, California, to pay for 
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improvements to the house and furnish it with antiques, to 
pay a $100,000 annual salary to his girlfriend, and to pay 
$20,000 in "professional fees" to his son. It also appears 
that Stewart "borrowed" $2 million from Summit through a 
similar scheme to pay for renovations to his wife's house in 
Radnor, Pennsylvania. 
 
Stewart ultimately concluded that he should sell Summit 
and EBL before anyone would have the opportunity to 
detect his fraudulent activities. In September 1992, he 
convinced Larry Fondren, an interested buyer, to sign a 
letter of intent to purchase the companies for approximately 
$8 million. When Fondren tried to examine their books his 
due diligence was obstructed, and thus he attempted to 
withdraw from the purchase. Stewart then sought another 
buyer but that buyer's accountant discovered that Summit 
and EBL were insolvent. Meanwhile, Stewart had brought 
suit against Fondren and thereby forced Fondren to go 
through with the purchase on the condition that he would 
not make a substantial payment for the companies. 
 
After he took over the companies, Fondren's fears were 
realized when he discovered that both were insolvent. He 
contacted the Department, which placed the companies 
into rehabilitation in 1994. The Department traced the 
companies' insolvency to Stewart's ownership period. 
 
As a result of the companies' insolvencies, over 9,000 life 
insurance policies were devalued, other policies became 
worthless, and other insurance companies that belonged to 
the same Guarantee Association were forced to take over 
certain liabilities of Summit and EBL. The government 
established at sentencing that the losses from the 
companies' insolvencies exceeded $80 million, and that 
Stewart was personally responsible for $60.1 million of this 
amount. 
 
Through Stewart's criminal activities, he accumulated -- 
aside from amounts not relevant to this discussion-- $3 
million which he deposited into his Account at Merrill 
Lynch on or about August 30, 1996. The Account 
previously contained $160,000, which was, as far as the 
government could ascertain, legitimate money not related to 
Stewart's criminal activity. The government obtained a 
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pretrial restraint against the withdrawal of the entire 
Account. Thereafter, the only withdrawal from the Account 
was $600,000, released pursuant to a July 3, 1997 
agreement between the government and Stewart so that he 
could retain trial attorneys of his choice. At the time of the 
withdrawal, Stewart and the government agreed that the 
$600,000 included the legitimate $160,000. Ultimately, the 
court ordered this Account forfeited as a substitute asset. 
 
B. Procedural History 
 
When Stewart's scheme collapsed, a grand jury indicted 
him. During the ensuing jury trial, the government sought 
to forfeit directly Stewart's personal Account at Merrill 
Lynch under the RICO forfeiture statute, 18 U.S.C.S 1963. 
In its special forfeiture verdict, however, the jury declined to 
forfeit the Account as property acquired or maintained as a 
result of Stewart's RICO violations. Following the trial the 
government nevertheless claimed that the Account should 
be forfeited as a substitute asset under 18 U.S.C. 
S 982(b)(1), a provision in the criminal money laundering 
forfeiture statute.1 The government later changed its 
position and requested that the funds in the Account be 
forfeited directly under 18 U.S.C. S 982(a)(1) as property 
"involved in" or "traceable to" Stewart's money laundering 
offenses. 
 
The district court at Stewart's sentencing hearing on 
August 12, 1998, considered the government's request to 
forfeit the Account directly. During the hearing, the 
government traced $3 million of laundered funds to the 
Account. These funds represented the same money that, 
according to the jury's verdict on Count 153 of the 
indictment, Stewart had withdrawn illegally from the Merrill 
Lynch account of Tartan Management Corporation, a 
company Stewart controlled. The jury specifically forfeited 
this $3 million in Count 157 under 18 U.S.C. S 982, the 
money laundering forfeiture provision. Despite the 
government's success in tracing the funds to the Account, 
the district court concluded that United States v. Voigt, 89 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The substitute asset provision in 21 U.S.C.S 853 is incorporated into 
18 U.S.C. S 982(b)(1). See id. (incorporating subsection (p) of 21 U.S.C. 
S 853). 
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F.3d 1050 (3d Cir. 1996), precluded the direct forfeiture of 
the $3 million because the money had been commingled 
with the $160,000 of untainted funds already in the 
Account. 
 
In an October 6, 1998 order, the court then considered 
the government's alternate request to forfeit the Account as 
a substitute asset. The court concluded that the 
government had satisfied the money laundering substitute 
asset provision because it demonstrated that qualified 
property, the $3 million Stewart withdrew from the Tartan 
Management account, had been "commingled with other 
property which cannot be divided without difficulty." 18 
U.S.C. S 982(b)(1) (incorporating 21 U.S.C.S 853(p)(5)). It 




Turning to the merits of this appeal, we first discuss 
Stewart's challenges to his conviction and then consider the 
challenges to the district court's October 6, 1998 forfeiture 
order.2 With respect to the purported trial errors, we 
address only those issues Stewart raised at oral argument, 
as we find the myriad other contentions contained in 
Stewart's brief to be clearly without merit.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. S 3231 and we 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 to review the district court's 
judgment of conviction and its October 1998 forfeiture order as well as 
the other orders on appeal. 
 
3. Accordingly, we reject without discussion Stewart's arguments that 
the district court violated his right of confrontation by prohibiting 
recross-examination, the RICO count as set forth in the indictment was 
defective on its face, the district court constructively amended the 
indictment's charges on RICO enterprise, the evidence was insufficient to 
establish that Stewart mailed the fraudulent communications for his 
mail fraud convictions, the evidence was insufficient to establish a 
scheme to defraud, the indictment failed to charge an essential element 
of the offense of money laundering by not mentioning a "financial 
institution," the district court constructively amended the indictment by 
broadening the potential basis of conviction for the money laundering 
counts, there was insufficient evidence to establish venue in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, there was insufficient evidence to establish 
that 
the fraudulent transactions affected interstate commerce, and 
the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. SS 1011-1015, barred the 
prosecution. 
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A. Did the district court violate Stewart's right to the 
       counsel of his choice by disqualifying his "expert" 
       attorneys? 
 
Stewart first argues that the district court's 
disqualification of certain of his attorneys deprived him of 
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. After conducting a 
hearing, the district court, on September 24, 1997, granted 
the government's motion to disqualify the law firm of 
Christie, Pabarue, Mortensen and Young ("Christie 
Pabarue") from representing Stewart in the criminal 
prosecution. See United States v. Stewart, No. 96-583, 1997 
WL 611594, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 1997). However, 
Robert E. Welsh, Jr., who was not from that firm, had 
represented Stewart since the middle of 1996, months 
before the grand jury indicted him on December 4, 1996, 
and the court did not disqualify Welsh. Although Christie 
Pabarue had been working "informally" with Welsh during 
the same period, the firm had not entered its appearance as 
co-counsel until July 31, 1997. Id. at *1. 
 
The conflict leading to Christie Pabarue's disqualification 
arose because the firm also had been representing Stewart, 
Jeanne Fletcher, June O'Brien, Geoffrey Stewart, and Paul 
Tamaccio in a civil RICO action in the district court brought 
by the Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner parallel to 
this case. Fletcher, O'Brien, Geoffrey Stewart, and Tamaccio 
had agreed with the government to testify for it at Stewart's 
criminal trial. These four persons had various relationships 
with Stewart that we describe below. On April 10, 1997, the 
district court in the civil action denied the Commissioner's 
motion to disqualify Christie Pabarue from representing 14 
co-defendants, including Stewart and these four 
individuals. See Kaiser v. Stewart, 1997 WL 186329, at *5 
(E.D. Pa Apr. 10, 1997). However, the firm's representation 
of Stewart in the criminal trial was more problematic to the 
district court. See United States v. Stewart, 1997 WL 
611594, at *1. 
 
The court recognized that the government had granted 
immunity to Fletcher, O'Brien, Geoffrey Stewart, and 
Tamaccio, and characterized their testimony as "significant" 
to the prosecution. Id. At the hearing on the government's 
disqualification motion in this case, Stewart and the four 
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witnesses each stated that he or she waived any conflicts, 
agreed to the disclosure of privileged information, and 
consented to allowing Christie Pabarue to serve as 
Stewart's attorney. Id. Yet, the district court determined 
that the firm's defending of Stewart was "directly adverse" 
to its representation of the four individuals, and thus 
placed the Christie Pabarue attorneys in the "unenviable 
position of cross-examining their own clients with the help 
of attorney-client communications." Id. at *3. 
 
Moreover, the court doubted that the four individuals 
comprehended the ramifications of adverse representation 
and questioned whether their waivers were truly voluntary 
inasmuch as each of the four was tied intimately to 
Stewart: Fletcher was still an officer of an operating 
insurance company Stewart owned and controlled; O'Brien 
was Stewart's live-in girlfriend; Geoffrey Stewart was his 
son; and Tamaccio was his step-son. Id. at *3-*4. 
Furthermore, Stewart was paying both O'Brien's civil and 
criminal legal fees, and his company was paying Fletcher's 
fees. Id. at *4. The court also recognized that it had an 
"independent responsibility to uphold the ethical precepts 
of the legal profession as well as the public interest in the 
integrity of the judicial process." Id. Finally, the court 
stated that Welsh was "able and experienced" and that "[n]o 
evidence or contention has been presented that [Christie 
Pabarue's] absence [would] prejudice Allen Stewart's right 
to a fair trial." Id. 
 
We review the district court's order in two stages. First, 
we exercise plenary review to determine whether the district 
court's disqualification was arbitrary -- "the product of a 
failure to balance proper considerations of judicial 
administration against the right to counsel." Voigt, 89 F.3d 
at 1074. If we find that the district court's decision was not 
arbitrary, we then determine whether the court abused its 
discretion in disqualifying the attorneys. See id. 
 
Stewart seems to attack the district court's 
disqualification decision as arbitrary, although he may be 
confusing the two aspects of our dual prong analysis. 
Stewart equates an adverse decision with an arbitrary one, 
and puts much stock in the fact that the court allowed 
Christie Pabarue to represent all of the defendants, 
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including Stewart and the four individuals, in the civil 
RICO case. We long have recognized, however, that"[a]s 
long as the court makes a `reasoned determination on the 
basis of a fully prepared record,' its decision will not be 
deemed arbitrary." Id. at 1075 (quoting Fuller v. Diesslin, 
868 F.2d 604, 609 n.4 (3d Cir. 1989)). In this case, the 
court held a hearing and properly balanced the factors for 
and against disqualifying Christie Pabarue. Thus, we 
cannot say that its decision was arbitrary, as we have 
defined that term in the context here, and we confine our 
review to determining whether the district court abused its 
discretion in making this decision. 
 
Considering Stewart's arguments in light of our 
deferential standard of review, we find that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying Christie 
Pabarue. Indeed, even if we were to review the court's 
decision de novo, we still would uphold its determination, 
as we have come to the same conclusion as did the district 
court regarding the propriety of Christie Pabarue's 
representation of Stewart at the criminal trial. 
 
Stewart claims that the district court erred because only 
a few months earlier in the civil RICO case it denied a 
"substantively indistinguishable motion." Br. at 24. 
However, Stewart mischaracterizes the situation, for while 
the motions sought similar relief, the circumstances 
surrounding their consideration were quite different. When 
the district court declined to disqualify Christie Pabarue in 
the civil RICO case, the firm was representing all the 
defendants in that suit but did not claim that it represented 
Stewart in the criminal action. See Kaiser v. Stewart, 1997 
WL 186329, at *1 n.1 ("Stewart has separate counsel in the 
criminal action."). Here, however, Stewart was the 
defendant in a criminal prosecution, and his civil co- 
defendants, figuratively at least, were sitting on the other 
side of the courtroom because they had agreed to testify 
against him under grants of immunity. Thus, Christie 
Pabarue's multiple representations in the civil RICO case 
created a conflict of interest with its representation of 
Stewart in his criminal trial. 
 
In disqualifying Christie Pabarue in the criminal case, the 
district court recognized that the firm "informally" had been 
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working with Welsh on Stewart's defense since "mid-1996." 
United States v. Stewart, 1997 WL 611594, at *1. Yet it is 
questionable that the district court in the civil RICO matter 
was aware of this fact when it denied the Commissioner's 
disqualification motion. Moreover, we believe that if it had 
known of the firm's "informal" representation of Stewart in 
the criminal case, the court might have viewed its 
representation of him in the civil case as much more 
problematic. 
 
We recognize but reject Stewart's argument that there 
was no "direct conflict of any kind" because the four 
individuals were not criminal defendants. Br. at 26 
(emphasis in original). While it is true that the typical 
scenario where disqualification becomes necessary entails 
an attorney's attempt to represent multiple defendants in 
the same prosecution, we have recognized that conflicts 
arise where a "defendant seeks to waive his right to 
conflict-free representation in circumstances in which the 
counsel of his choice may have divided loyalties due to 
concurrent or prior representation of another client who is 
a co-defendant, a co-conspirator, or a government witness." 
United States v. Moscony, 927 F.2d 742, 749 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(emphasis added). 
 
Because the Christie Pabarue attorneys would have been 
part of a team of attorneys required to cross-examine the 
four individuals testifying for the government, Stewart's 
right to effective counsel could have been compromised by 
the divided loyalties of his own attorney: "Conflicts of 
interest arise whenever an attorney's loyalties are divided, 
and an attorney who cross-examines former clients 
inherently encounters divided loyalties." Id. at 750 
(citations omitted). Thus, Stewart is mistaken in arguing 
that Christie Pabarue's multiple representations did not 
pose a serious potential for conflicts of interest simply 
because the four individuals were not co-defendants in the 
criminal trial. 
 
Similarly, we reject Stewart's contention that the district 
court's "theory as to why Mr. Stewart's interests diverged 
from the four witnesses' interests collapses under scrutiny." 
Br. at 27. The district court stated that it could be an 
"obvious" defense theory at trial to focus blame for 
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wrongdoing on the four individuals. United States v. 
Stewart, 1997 WL 611594, at *3. Stewart claims that such 
a theory was "directly contrary to the publicly declared 
strategy of defense that counsel had already adopted." Br. 
at 27 (emphasis in original). The defense's "publicly 
declared strategy" was to assert that the allegedly 
fraudulent transactions were legal because Stewart had 
received the approval from the proper regulatory agencies 
for them. Id. 
 
We recognize that, as the Supreme Court noted in Wheat 
v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 164, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 1700 
(1988), there is a presumption in favor of a defendant's 
choice of attorneys. But the Supreme Court went on to 
explain that: 
 
       that presumption may be overcome not only by a 
       demonstration of actual conflict but by a showing of a 
       serious potential for conflict. The evaluation of the facts 
       and circumstances of each case under this standard 
       must be left primarily to the informed judgment of the 
       trial court. 
 
Id., 108 S.Ct. at 1700 (emphasis added). 
 
Moreover, notwithstanding an attorney's pretrial 
assurances otherwise, a defendant's trial strategy is not 
fixed. Thus, if an attorney has been unsuccessful in 
bringing out the necessary points in support of a 
contemplated defense, the attorney may change his strategy 
to provide the defendant with the best possible defense. 
Accordingly, the district court could not accept Stewart's 
assurances that he would not pursue an alternate strategy 
at trial. In fact, by so doing, the court would have been 
opening the door for a manufactured mistrial or a possible 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim on appeal. We 
emphasize that this was a complex trial and that during the 
course of a case of this nature a defendant well might 
change his strategy. In this regard, we point out that a 
district court will not limit a defendant at trial to the 
position the defendant stated in pretrial public statements, 
which a court will not regard as a defensive bill of 
particulars. 
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Furthermore, we find equally unavailing Stewart's 
argument that the district court abused its discretion in 
disqualifying Christie Pabarue in the face of his and the 
other four individuals' waiver of any conflicts. Stewart's 
argument does not take into account the court's obligation 
to examine the validity of a waiver. After all, we have held 
that "[s]uch a waiver, . . . does not necessarily resolve the 
matter, for the trial court has an institutional interest in 
protecting the truth-seeking function of the proceedings 
over which it is presiding by considering whether the 
defendant has effective assistance of counsel, regardless of 
any proffered waiver." Moscony, 927 F.2d at 749. The 
tension between protecting the institutional legitimacy of 
judicial proceedings, which includes a concern to shield a 
defendant from having his defense compromised by an 
attorney with divided loyalties, and allowing a defendant to 
be represented by the attorney of his choice, creates the 
disqualification issue. Thus, a district court has discretion 
to disqualify counsel if a potential conflict exists, see 
Wheat, 486 U.S. at 164, 108 S.Ct. at 1700, even where the 
represented parties have waived the conflict. 
 
Moreover, we agree with the district court's conclusion 
that the four individuals did not "fully comprehend[ ] the 
ramifications flowing from joint representation" and we 
share the court's doubt that the waivers were "truly 
voluntary." United States v. Stewart, 1997 WL 611594, at 
*3-*4. As the district court noted, even with its vast 
experience in presiding over criminal trials, it cannot 
foresee what ramifications can flow from multiple 
representations. Thus, the court had good reason to doubt 
"that anyone could be sufficiently prescient to foresee the 
exact path this case [would] take either in the time 
remaining before trial or at trial." Id. at *3. Further, the 
four individuals had personal relationships with Stewart 
and could have felt that by waiving the conflicts and their 
privileges they somehow were lessening the damage that 
their adverse testimony would cause to Stewart. When we 
also consider that Stewart either personally or through his 
insurance company was paying the legal fees of two of 
these individuals, we see no reason to upset the district 
court's judgment on this matter. 
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Finally, we reject Stewart's claim that the government 
manufactured the conflict to disadvantage him at trial. Br. 
at 28-29. Such a claim flies in the face of reality inasmuch 
as the government agreed to immunity for all four 
individuals and thus to that extent lessened the conflict. In 
any event, the conflict was real. Accordingly, we will affirm 
the district court's order disqualifying Christie Pabarue 
from representing Stewart in this case. 
 
B. Did the indictment omit an element of "mail fraud"? 
 
Stewart argues that we must reverse the mail fraud 
convictions -- and consequently the money laundering and 
RICO convictions that relied upon the mail fraud counts as 
predicate acts -- because the indictment and jury 
instructions omitted the "knowing" element of causing a 
fraudulent communication to be mailed. Br. at 49. 4 He 
claims that a violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1341 requires a 
showing that the defendant "mails or knowingly causes to 
be mailed an article in furtherance of a scheme to defraud." 
Id. According to this argument, the indictment's language 
drops this knowing element. The indictment states: 
 
       54. On or about each of the dates listed below, in the 
       Eastern District of Pennsylvania and elsewhere, the 
       defendant, 
 
       ALLEN W. STEWART 
 
       for the purpose of executing the scheme and artifice 
       described above and attempting to do so, caused to be 
       placed in an authorized depository for mail matter  the 
       documents described below to be sent by the United 
       States Postal Service, any one of which placements 
       constitutes the commission of Act One. . . . 
 
Joint app. at 1240-41 (emphasis added). 
 
The mail fraud statute provides: 
 
        Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any 
       scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Because this argument raises a legal question of the elements of a 
criminal offense, we exercise plenary review. See United States v. Mosley, 
126 F.3d 200, 201 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. dismissed, 119 S.Ct. 484 (1998). 
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       property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
       representations, or promises, . . . for the purpose of 
       executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to 
       do, places in any post office or authorized depository for 
       mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or 
       delivered by the Postal Service, . . . or takes or receives 
       therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly 
       causes to be delivered by mail . . . according to the 
       direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed 
       to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, 
       any such matter or thing, shall be fined . . . or 
       imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 1341 (emphasis added). 
 
We hold that inasmuch as 18 U.S.C. S 1341 does not 
require the "knowing" placing of a communication in an 
authorized depository for mail matter, the indictment 
correctly charged Stewart with causing communications to 
be placed in an authorized depository for mail matter. Use 
of the term "caused to be placed" in the indictment referred 
to the fact that a defendant can be held responsible for 
actions that he orders or directs another to perform. See 18 
U.S.C. S 2(b). The jury was instructed on this theory of 
criminal responsibility. Joint app. at 3018-19. Conversely, 
Congress added the reference to "knowingly causes to be 
delivered" in section 1341 to ensure that a defendant would 
not be held responsible for fraudulent mailings where he 
unknowingly processes a piece of mail or otherwise is 
involved unwittingly with fostering the material's delivery. 
Because of this distinction, we hold that the indictment 
properly charged Stewart with mail fraud. 
 
C. Was Stewart entitled to an "entrapment by estoppel" 
       instruction? 
 
Stewart argues that the district court erred in refusing to 
charge the jury on his defense theory of "entrapment by 
estoppel" -- that he had made the allegedly illegal 
transactions in reliance on the "categorical approval of all 
necessary state regulatory bodies after full investigation 
and disclosure." Br. at 56-57. Stewart argues that under 
Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63, 108 S.Ct. 883, 
887 (1988), and United States v. Mosley, 126 F.3d 200, 203 
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(3d Cir. 1997), cert. dismissed, 119 S.Ct. 484 (1998), the 
district court's refusal to charge the jury on a recognized 
defense, for which there exists evidence for a reasonable 
jury to find in the defendant's favor, was reversible error. 
 
We review the district court's refusal to instruct the jury 
on a defense theory de novo in light of the fact that Stewart 
objected to the court's refusal to give the charge. See 
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Joseph, 765 F.2d 394, 
398 (3d Cir. 1985). The entrapment by estoppel defense 
applies where the defendant has established by a 
preponderance of the evidence that: 
 
       (1) a government official (2) told the defendant that 
       certain criminal conduct was legal, (3) the defendant 
       actually relied on the government official's statements, 
       (4) and the defendant's reliance was in good faith and 
       reasonable in light of the identity of the government 
       official, the point of law represented, and the substance 
       of the official's statement. 
 
United States v. West Indies Transp., Inc., 127 F.3d 299, 
313 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
Stewart argues that he was entitled to have the district 
court instruct the jury on the defense based upon his 
interactions with the Ohio insurance regulators in 
purchasing Summit. The Ohio regulators initially had 
ordered the transaction unwound, but allowed the 
transaction to go through after being sued by Stewart. 
Pursuant to a Settlement Agreement, Ohio allowed the sale 
on the condition that Stewart move Summit out of Ohio 
and sell all of its Ohio policies to other Ohio insurance 
companies. Stewart argues that this Settlement Agreement 
 
       represented (1) the statement of a government official 
       (the Ohio Superintendent of Insurance), (2) to 
       defendant that certain conduct (the purchase of SNLIC- 
       Ohio as proposed, together with the cession of the Ohio 
       Business and relocation to Pennsylvania by merger 
       with Parkway) was lawful, and (3) the defendant relied 
       on the Settlement Agreement, (4) with such reliance 
       being in good faith and reasonable in light of the 
       Superintendent's authority, the points of law at issue, 
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       and the substance of the statements in the Settlement 
       Agreement. 
 
Br. at 59. 
 
We find that the evidence cannot establish an 
entrapment by estoppel defense and thus the court 
properly refused to charge on the defense. The Ohio 
Superintendent never stated to Stewart that the criminal 
conduct for which the jury later convicted him was legal. 
While Ohio ultimately consented to Stewart's purchase of 
Summit, it did not, and could not, approve of his 
concealment of Summit's and EBL's huge deficits, and his 
stealing funds from both companies. Accordingly, there is 
simply no reasonable way that the record can be read to 
support a conclusion that the Ohio regulators' highly 
conditional consent to Stewart's acquisition of Summit 
amounted to a statement that Stewart's conduct 
constituting mail fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, and 
RICO violations was legal. 
 
Furthermore, the Ohio regulators did not even make a 
clear statement approving of Stewart's acquisition of 
Summit. Rather, the Settlement Agreement provides that 
"[n]othing contained herein shall constitute or be construed 
as an admission by any party hereto of the truth or validity 
of any of the claims or contentions asserted by either party 
in any of the Administrative Proceedings or the Court 
Proceedings, or the ratification of any past conduct by 
either party." Joint app. at 463. Thus, the parties expressly 
agreed that neither could construe the agreement as 
ratifying any past conduct. The agreement also 
demonstrates that Ohio's regulators, although stopping 
short of affirmatively accusing Stewart of illegal activity, did 
not want him conducting business in Ohio. As conditions of 
the Settlement Agreement, Ohio forced Summit to sell all of 
its Ohio policies, move to a different state, and surrender 
its authority to do business in Ohio. See id. at 457-58. No 
reasonable person can construe an agreement in which the 
regulators essentially ushered Stewart out of Ohio as 
approving of Stewart's conduct. Accordingly, for this reason 
as well, we hold that the Ohio regulators' statements 
cannot reasonably support a conclusion that the regulators 
condoned Stewart's illegal activities. 
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At bottom, Stewart's case is more like West Indies, 127 
F.3d 299, than United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial 
Chemical Corp., 461 F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 1972), modified and 
remanded, 411 U.S. 655, 93 S.Ct. 1804 (1973), the only 
case in which we have found that the evidence supported 
an entrapment by estoppel defense. In Pennsylvania 
Industrial we reversed the defendant's conviction for 
discharging pollution in violation of the Rivers and Harbors 
Act, 33 U.S.C. S 407, because the district court refused to 
charge the jury on the entrapment by estoppel defense or to 
allow the defendant to present evidence that Army 
regulations and the government's long-term interpretation 
of the statute authorized its allegedly criminal acts. 461 
F.2d at 479. 
 
In West Indies, however, we affirmed the defendants' 
convictions despite the district court's refusal to instruct 
the jury on the entrapment by estoppel defense. 127 F.3d 
at 313-14. In that case, the defendants argued that their 
convictions for visa fraud could not stand over an estoppel 
defense because they had informed the INS fully of their 
conduct of which it then approved. Id. at 313. The 
defendants also argued that estoppel principles barred their 
convictions for illegal dumping inasmuch as the Coast 
Guard placed a placard stating that some types of 
"nonplastic trash" may be discharged at sea if the vessel is 
at least 12 nautical miles from shore. Id. at 314. We 
rejected both of these arguments on the grounds that the 
government never approved of the specific criminal activity. 
The INS was not apprised of the entire situation when 
granting the visas in question, while the Coast Guard's 
placard did not claim to set out all of the dumping 
restrictions. Id. at 313-14. 
 
The circumstances here are similar. The Ohio regulators 
did not approve of Stewart's criminal conduct described in 
the counts on which the jury convicted him. Thus, we hold 
that the district court did not err in refusing to instruct the 
jury on the entrapment by estoppel defense because 
Stewart did not present sufficient evidence to permit a jury 
to conclude that he established the defense by a 
preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., United States v. 
Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1290-91 (9th Cir. 1993) (refusal 
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to instruct jury on entrapment by estoppel defense upheld); 
United States v. Billue, 994 F.2d 1562, 1568-69 (11th Cir. 
1993) (same); United States v. LaChapelle, 969 F.2d 632, 
637-38 (8th Cir. 1992) (same); United States v. Hurst, 951 
F.2d 1490, 1499 (6th Cir. 1991) (same).5  
 
D. Did the district court err in giving a "willful 
       blindness" instruction? 
 
Stewart contends that although the district court 
instructed the jury that it could convict him on the mail 
and wire fraud counts based on "willful blindness," the 
government proceeded at trial on an actual-knowledge 
theory. He argues that this charge constituted reversible 
error because it lowered the government's burden of 
proving intent. He also argues that the court's instruction 
was flawed "as a matter of law" because the court omitted 
the "high probability requirement" that United States v. 
Caminos, 770 F.2d 361, 365 (3d Cir. 1985), required. 
Because Stewart objected to this instruction at trial, we 
review the instruction de novo. See Joseph, 765 F.2d at 
398. 
 
We have upheld a district court's willful blindness 
instruction where the charge made "clear that the 
defendant himself was subjectively aware of the high 
probability of the fact in question, and not merely that a 
reasonable man would have been aware of the probability." 
Caminos, 770 F.2d at 365. In other words, a willful 
blindness charge does not lower the government's burden 
of proving intent as long as it "emphasize[s] the necessity of 
proving a subjective awareness." Id. at 366. If the charge 
satisfies this standard, and is supported by sufficient 
evidence, it is not inconsistent for a court to charge a jury 
on both an actual knowledge theory and a willful blindness 
theory. See United States v. Stuart, 22 F.3d 76, 81 (3d Cir. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Although we do not reach the issue, we are doubtful that a defendant 
can claim an entrapment by estoppel defense when, as Stewart contends 
was the case here, the government official is a state official who 
approves 
of the criminal conduct on state law grounds and the defendant is 
accused of violating federal law. See Hurst, 951 F.2d at 1499-50; United 
States v. Etheridge, 932 F.2d 318, 320-21 (4th Cir. 1991); United States 
v. Bruscantini, 761 F.2d 640, 641-42 (11th Cir. 1985). 
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1994). Moreover, contrary to Stewart's second assertion, we 
do not require a court's charge to contain specific language 
that a defendant must have "a subjective awareness of a 
high probability that something is amiss." See id. at 81 
(upholding the following instruction: "The government may 
prove that a person acted knowingly by proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that that person deliberately closed his 
eyes to what otherwise would have been obvious to him. 
One cannot avoid responsibility for an offense by 
deliberately ignoring what is obvious."). 
 
Momentarily putting aside the issue of the sufficiency of 
the evidence that would justify instructing the jury on 
willful blindness, we consider Stewart's claim that the 
district court's instruction on willful blindness was 
erroneous as a matter of law. The full instruction reads: 
 
        The government can meet its burden of proving 
       fraudulent intent not only by showing that a defendant 
       knowingly lied but also by proving beyond a reasonable 
       doubt that he acted with deliberate disregard of 
       whether the statements were true or false or with a 
       conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth. 
 
        Stated another way, a defendant's knowledge of a 
       fact may be inferred from a deliberate or intentional 
       ignorance of or willful blindness to the existence of that 
       fact. It is entirely up to you as to whether youfind any 
       deliberate closing of the eyes and as to the inferences 
       to be drawn from any such evidence. 
 
        This guilty knowledge, however, cannot be 
       established by demonstrating that the defendant was 
       merely negligent or foolish. These legal concepts 
       concerning proof of fraudulent intent apply to all the 
       counts of the superseding indictment which allege 
       fraud as an element. 
 
Joint app. at 3031-32. Comparing this instruction to the 
one we approved in Stuart, we conclude that the district 
court's charge was sufficient to guard against the jury 
convicting Stewart under an objective standard of willful 
blindness. In fact, we consider the court's charge here more 
clearly to emphasize the distinction between objectively 
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foolish behavior and deliberate or intentional ignorance 
than the Stuart charge. 
 
Moreover, the evidence justified the instruction. Stewart 
argued at trial that he lacked the intent to defraud because 
he relied upon the findings of solvency reported in state 
examinations and audit reports. But the evidence permitted 
the jury to conclude that this was simply not the case. The 
jury could have found that Stewart deliberately closed his 
eyes to what otherwise would have been obvious to him 
concerning the financial problems of these companies. 
Stewart could have recognized the likelihood of insolvency 
yet deliberately avoided learning the true facts. Therefore, 
the instruction was justified in this instance. 
 
E. Did the district court fail to give the jury a proper 
       unanimity charge? 
 
Stewart argues that the district court violated his right to 
a unanimous verdict on all of the counts of the indictment 
by not giving a unanimity charge. However, we find this 
contention to be insubstantial because Stewart did not 
object to the unanimity instructions, and, in fact, if there 
had been error on the court's part concerning Counts 2, 4, 
14, 16 through 19, and 22 (for mail and wire fraud), 
Stewart invited it by objecting to the government's proposed 
unanimity charge on those counts. Joint app. at 3053-54. 
Thus, Stewart has waived all of these issues on appeal, and 
we would reverse only if the court committed plain error in 
instructing the jury on the counts where Stewart did not 
invite the error. See United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 
1252, 1260 (3d Cir. 1995) (general waiver); United States v. 
Console, 13 F.3d 641, 660 (3d Cir. 1993) (invited error). 
 
In any event, we find no plain error in the court's 
charges, and indeed no error at all in the district court's 
unanimity instructions. We begin our discussion on this 
point with the mail and wire fraud charges inasmuch as 
they are the basis of the RICO and money laundering 
counts. 
 
The court began early in its charge with a general 
instruction that "each of the 135 counts of the superseding 
indictment which are before you for decision . . . must be 
considered separately." Joint app. at 3010. Moving to the 
 
                                23 
  
specific mail and wire frauds charges, the court informed 
the jury that "each separate use of the mails or wires in 
furtherance of the scheme to defraud constitutes a separate 
offense or violation of the mail and wire fraud statutes." Id. 
at 3035. 
 
This instruction followed the court's setting out of the 
four schemes alleged in the indictment. The court charged 
the jury that Counts 2, 4, 14, and 16 through 19 for mail 
fraud and Count 22 for wire fraud described a scheme to 
"defraud and to obtain money and property by wrongfully 
taking valuable assets from Summit . . . and [EBL]. . . ." Id. 
at 3024-25. The court distinguished this scheme from that 
set forth in Counts 24 through 32 for wire fraud that 
alleged a scheme "to deceive state insurance regulators 
involving reinsurance." Id. at 3025. The court then outlined 
the scheme "to defraud and obtain money and property by 
inflating Summit['s] . . . financial statements with 
overvalued promissory notes from its parent, its corporate 
parent, SNL Corp., in order to deceive regulators, the buyer 
and others regarding the true financial condition of the 
company" set forth in Counts 33, 36 through 73 and 76 
through 118 for mail fraud. Id. at 3025-26. Finally, at the 
conclusion of its instructions, the court repeatedly 
admonished the jury that it was required to agree 
unanimously on "each count" of the indictment. Id. at 
3049-3052. We find these instructions sufficiently clear to 
ensure that the jury understood that it must agree 
unanimously on each count of the mail and wire fraud 
allegations set forth in the indictment. 
 
Likewise, the court's instructions concerning the RICO 
and money laundering charges were quite clear. In 
describing the alleged acts of racketeering, the court 
referred back to its instructions on the mail and wire fraud 
charges and later directed the jury that it "must 
unanimously agree on the identity of at least two of the 
same racketeering acts alleged to have been committed by 
[Stewart]." Id. at 3039-41. Similarly, the court again 
referred back to its instructions regarding the mail and wire 
fraud charges when instructing the jury on the money 
laundering counts. See id. at 3044, 3046. Thus, 
considering these instructions in their entirety, even if 
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Stewart had not waived the issue or invited the error, we 
would conclude that the court's instructions were clear on 
the unanimity issue. 
 
Finally, we note that because the jury convicted Stewart 
on all 135 counts of the indictment, even if the district 
court erred in charging the jury on unanimity, such error 
would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See United 
States v. Edmonds, 80 F.3d 810, 812-13 (3d Cir. 1996) (en 
banc). Inasmuch as the jury reached a unanimous 
agreement on each count, including those counts that were 
predicate offenses for RICO and the money laundering 
charges, it could not possibly have disagreed on any 
elements of the individual crimes. This case is simply not 
one in which some jurors relied on a fraudulent mailing 
while the others relied upon a fraudulent wire transfer in 
convicting on the RICO charges. 
 
Contrary to Stewart's assertions at oral argument, 
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 S.Ct. 2078 (1993), 
does not preclude us from finding harmless error in this 
instance. The Supreme Court held in Sullivan that an 
erroneous reasonable doubt instruction cannot be harmless 
because this error calls the ultimate verdict of guilt into 
doubt. Id. at 280-81, 113 S.Ct. at 2082. As we recognized 
in Edmonds, while Sullivan concerned a situation where "an 
erroneous reasonable doubt instruction undermined all of 
the jury's findings, the jury in this case delivered valid 
findings on essentially all of the elements of the offense by 
convicting [the defendant] of every violation.. . ." Edmonds, 
80 F.3d at 812. Thus, we do not doubt the validity of the 
jury's verdict here, nor do we question that this verdict 
reflects anything but its unanimous agreement on each 
element of each count of the indictment. Accordingly, we 
will affirm. 
 
F. Did the district court err in concluding that the 
       Account was not directly forfeitable? 
 
We now consider two appeals from the October 6, 1998 
forfeiture order. In the first, Stewart raises a number of 
challenges to the order, including a Sixth Amendment claim 
that the forfeiture prevented him from using the forfeited 
money to finance his criminal defense. Stewart's claims 
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depend on the assumption that the Account could be 
forfeited only as a substitute asset.6  We understand him to 
concede, however, that his claims on appeal must fail if the 
Account was directly forfeitable rather than forfeitable 
merely as a substitute asset and, in any event, that is the 
case. The government cross-appeals, claiming that the 
district court erred in failing to forfeit the Account directly 
under the relevant money laundering provision, 18 U.S.C. 
S 982(a)(1). 
 
We will affirm the district court's judgment of forfeiture 
but will reverse the court's order finding that the Account 
was not directly forfeitable. Thus, we will modify the 
forfeiture order. Inasmuch as we agree with the 
government's argument that the Account was directly 
forfeitable as proceeds of a money laundering violation, we 
need not reach the issues Stewart raises.7  
 
We begin our analysis of the district court's forfeiture 
order by considering the jury's verdict in this case. In its 
special forfeiture verdict, the jury declined to forfeit the 
Account as property acquired or maintained as a result of 
Stewart's RICO violations. But the jury did find Stewart 
guilty on Count 153, a money laundering count under 18 
U.S.C. S 1957, which charged him with having withdrawn 
illegally $3 million from the account of Tartan Management. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Stewart's claims are: (i) that because the Account was forfeitable only 
as a substitute asset, the district court had no power to restrain it from 
May 1998 to October of that year, the time between Stewart's request to 
lift the pre-trial restraints and the court's order forfeiting the Account 
as 
a substitute asset; (ii) that forfeiture of the Account under the 
substitute 
asset provision violates his Sixth Amendment right to counsel because 
he intended to use these funds to pay his post-conviction attorneys; (iii) 
that prior to entering the substitute asset forfeiture order, the district 
court failed to ascertain correctly the shortfall in the government's 
recovery of directly forfeited property; and (iv) that when his sentence, 
fine, restitution and forfeiture orders are considered together, the 
forfeiture of the Account as a substitute asset is excessive under the 
Eighth Amendment. 
 
7. We review de novo as involving a legal question the district court's 
interpretation of the money laundering forfeiture provisions so as to 
forfeit the Account as a substitute asset rather than as criminal 
proceeds. See In re Assets of Martin, 1 F.3d 1351, 1357 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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In Count 157, the jury specifically forfeited these funds 
under 18 U.S.C. S 982. At the sentencing hearing in 
August, the Government used appropriate records to trace 
the $3 million forfeited by the jury to the Account. Yet, the 
district court concluded that, under United States v. Voigt, 
89 F.3d 1050, the money in the Account could be forfeited 
only under the substitute asset provision. While we 
understand why the district court reached this conclusion, 
we find its ruling erroneous because the facts of Voigt are 
distinguishable from the facts of this case. 
 
In Voigt, the government sought to forfeit directly jewelry 
that a defendant had purchased with funds from an 
account in which money laundering proceeds had been 
commingled with other funds. See 89 F.3d at 1081. There 
had been numerous intervening deposits and withdrawals 
between the deposit of the tainted money and the purchase 
of the jewelry. See id. Considering these facts, we concluded 
that the government simply could not show by a 
preponderance of the evidence, as it was required to do 
under the money laundering statute, that the jewelry was 
"involved in" or "traceable to" the defendant's illegal activity. 
See id. at 1082 (citing the money laundering direct 
forfeiture provision, 18 U.S.C. S 982(a)(1)). Moreover, we 
stated that an interpretation of the statute allowing the 
government to forfeit directly the jewelry would force the 
court to ignore the substitute asset forfeiture provision, 
which specifically provides for the forfeiture of property as 
a substitute asset when property involved in or traceable to 
the criminal activity "has been commingled with other 
property which cannot be divided without difficulty." See id. 
at 1085 (citing the substitute asset provision, 21 U.S.C. 
S 853(p)(5), incorporated into the money laundering 
statute). 
 
This case, however, presents quite different facts. First, 
the government is not seeking to forfeit property purchased 
with commingled funds. Thus, we are not dealing with 
property analogous to the jewelry in Voigt. Instead, after 
tracing the $3 million transfer to the Account, which 
previously contained only $160,000, the government seeks 
to forfeit directly the remaining approximately $2.6 million. 
Second, this case does not involve numerous withdrawals 
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and deposits from and into an account containing 
commingled funds because almost immediately after 
Stewart transferred the $3 million into the Account, the 
court restrained withdrawals from the Account. Since that 
time, the only withdrawal from the Account was the 
$600,000 that the government agreed to allow Stewart to 
use to pay his trial attorney. 
 
The single withdrawal aside, the question posed by this 
appeal is whether the government may forfeit directly 
tainted funds from an account that has been frozen from 
the time of the illegal transfer but that also contains 
untainted money. It is true that Voigt appeared to answer 
this question in the negative: in a footnote, the court stated 
that the substitute asset provision would have to apply to 
commingled cash even if "one readily could separate out the 
amount subject to forfeiture." 89 F.3d at 1088 n.24. But 
this statement in Voigt is dicta because Voigt was not a case 
in which "one readily could separate out the amount 
subject to forfeiture." Accordingly, the holding of Voigt does 
not require us to find against direct forfeiture in this case. 
 
Indeed, if we were to rule against direct forfeiture in this 
case our holding would contradict congressional intent as 
expressed in the money laundering forfeiture statute. 
Property is directly forfeitable under that statute when it is 
"involved in" or "traceable to" the defendant's illegal activity. 
18 U.S.C. S 982(a)(1). Here, the government clearly traced 
laundered funds forfeited by the jury to Stewart's Account. 
Stewart does not contest this tracing, which in any event 
the government clearly established. Moreover, the 
substitute asset provision of the statute applies only when 
commingled property cannot be "divided without difficulty." 
21 U.S.C. S 853(p)(5). 
 
The Voigt panel surely was accurate when it concluded 
that the substitute asset provision must be used"once a 
defendant has commingled laundered funds with untained 
funds . . . such that they `cannot be divided without 
difficulty.' " 89 F.3d at 1088 (citing 21 U.S.C. S 853(p)(5)). 
We do not see any difficulty, however, in separating out the 
tainted $3 million from the untainted $160,000 that the 
Account contained. There would be a difficulty only if one 
were to attach significance to which actual bills were left in 
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a defendant's account after the direct forfeiture; certainly a 
defendant has no legitimate interest in preferring one dollar 
bill to another as long as he is left with the same amount 
of legitimate funds. 
 
Neither does the fact that the government agreed to the 
withdrawal of $600,000 from the Account to finance 
Stewart's trial defense affect our direct forfeiture analysis. 
As the government made clear at oral argument, Stewart 
agreed that untainted money would be deemed withdrawn 
first. Because the Account contained only $160,000 of 
untainted funds, Stewart already has used the funds in the 
Account to which he was entitled legitimately. We therefore 
conclude that the remaining approximately $2.6 million in 
the Account should be forfeited directly to the government 





For the foregoing reasons, we will modify the district 
court's October 6, 1998 forfeiture order so that the 
forfeiture is direct rather than of a substitute asset. As 
modified, we affirm the forfeiture order and we will affirm 
the judgment of conviction and sentence entered August 
13, 1998, and all other orders on appeal. 
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